Films produced during the last two decades in the post-Yugoslav states often deal with the subject of these states’ recent history, focusing on the war and its consequences for human beings, as well as the consequences of political and economic transition, such as an increasing wealth gap, criminality, lack of perspectives, unemployment etc. The methods of presentation and modality range from the serious to the comical and grotesque. As these films reflect in special ways people’s new situation in the new post-Yugoslav countries, questions of self-image, understanding of oneself and of the cruel experiences of war are of utmost importance.
In recent post-Yugoslav cinema, trope of troubled youth in films as diverse as Skinning (Stevan Filipović, 2010, Serbia), Children of Sarajevo (Aida Begić, 2012, Bosnia-Herzegovina), Spots (Aldo Tardozzi, 2011, Croatia) and Quit Staring at My Plate (Hana Jušić, 2017) allows for an inspection of the links between youth rebellion, post-conflict trauma and social class. These cinematic depictions of youth-in-crisis, which I refer to as transitional films, offer insights into locally produced ethno-national identities as challenged by the proliferating transnational networks of connectivity. In this essay, I highlight one provocative example of transitional film – Clip (Maja Miloš, 2012, Serbia).
Post-Yugoslav cinema is commonly seen as a field abundant in nationalist traits, while the work of post-Yugoslav scholars is criticized for advocating the notion of continuity of nations. However, by analyzing the most representative films from Yugoslav and Post-Yugoslav eras, it can be argued that many traits dominant in post-Yugoslav cinema (not exclusively those connected to the prevalence of nationalism) began long before the actual dissolution of Yugoslavia. However abrupt these historical occurrences might have been, Yugoslavia and its cinema still did not sever all ties with the past: the newly forming national cultural traditions and discourses still shared some traits with traditions and discourses from the Yugoslav period of history.
This paper aims to analyse the extent to which new political parties in Croatia and Slovenia use populist political communication discourse in social media. This paper focuses on two new parties that entered the parliament in the most recent elections: Živi zid (Human Blockade) in Croatia, and Združena levica (United Left) in Slovenia. The paper will analyse these parties’ political communication on Facebook. The main question guiding the analysis is: to what extent are new parties in Croatia and Slovenia populist in their political communication on Facebook? The method used in the paper will be content analysis, with a Facebook post as a unit of analysis. The content analysis will be performed on posts published over a period of two weeks prior to the general elections (electoral campaigns).
The build-up of nationalism in Yugoslavia and its successor states was accompanied by a seismic shift in public discourse, as the national political elites mobilised the rhetoric of Othering in order to distinguish their respective nations from ‘the Balkans’, to construct and reinforce a new national identity, and to endorse European integration. This paper investigates how the discourses of Balkanism and Othering functioned in international relations by examining how the Balkans were represented in the foreign policy articulations of Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina during and after the Yugoslav conflicts. By analysing speeches delivered at the UN General Assembly between 1993 and 2003, this paper investigates how Southeast European states constructed their identities on the international stage and capitalised on “Balkan” identity for foreign policy objectives.
Populism has been vastly present in Croatian media discourse as a common point of reference but it has been almost completely left out from scientific inquiry. Building on the premise that populism is reflected in communication practices of politicians, parties and movements, this paper uses content analysis to examine interviews of the four presidential candidates during election campaign in Croatia in 2014 (first round) and 2015 (second round). We apply a two-level approach to measure populism on two distinct but related levels - as a thin-centered political ideology and as a political communication style. Populism as ideology is examined through the presence of positive references to the people, relationship to political elites and references to ‘dangerous others’.
This conclusion poses a number of questions related to policy issues and the censuses in the post-Yugoslav states. It is argued that censuses are always more than just a technical counting exercise. Census discussions in Western Europe tend to focus on regional funding, infrastructure support and long-term policy planning, and can be as contested and heated as questions over identity, religion and mother tongue in the post-Yugoslav states. However, identity-related questions in an area in which identity is still in flux and in which fundamental demographic changes have taken place recently, prevent any focus on more policy-oriented discussions.
Within the framework of EU enlargement, the population and housing census is a pre-condition for EU membership. The 2011 census in Croatia was conducted according to EU regulations and considering this, it should present a good example for the region. However, there are some aspects which are not addressed by EU regulations, but are of importance when looking at censuses in the Western Balkans: the so-called sensitive issues such as ethnicity, language and religion. Answers to these questions are not required by the EU; nonetheless all Western Balkan countries have included these questions in their censuses. In Croatia, the census results are used to determine political participation by proportional representation of ethnic minorities, and this has led to ethnic tensions .
Since 1991, every country in the former Yugoslavia has either held, or has at-tempted to hold, a census. The most recent efforts occurred in or around 2011, reflecting both the interest of harmonizing with the European Union’s (EU) own 2011 census round, as well as the need for accurate data in a region that has experienced significant population flux in the past generation. Macedonia’s 2011 census was cancelled during the enumeration period due to objections related to the counting procedure, but grounded in politics related to the Macedonian and Albanian populations, and representation provisions in the Ohrid Framework Agreement that ended the violent conflict in the country in 2001. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) collected data for the first time since the war in 2013, but as of this writing (October 2015) the results have not been finalised.
The Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ) has won yet another election in Croatia. After the success it had on the European and presidential elections, the so-called „Patriotic Coalition“, led by the aforementioned party has won 59 out of 151 seats in the Parliament. Their opponents, a slightly-altered version of the current leading coalition led by the leftist Social Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske, SDP), won 56 seats. However, the results are far from final. According to the Croatian Constitution, the party that would be given the mandate to form a government has to assure the support of 76 seats in the Parliament. So far, none of the new major parties has succeeded in that task.