This article examines the developments around the application of the Twinning modality in Serbia, from 2004 to 2019, its sectoral distribu-tion and impact, and the frequency of EU member states’ participa-tion. Besides providing an accurate state-of-play, it attempts, for the first time in the literature, to map the influence of member states in Serbia’s EU accession process through their participation in Twinning projects. Findings show that, in the given period, more than half of the Twinning projects dealt with the justice and home affairs and ag-riculture policy areas. This is in line with the importance attributed to those sectors in EU and Serbian strategic documents. The article fo-cuses on a macro-analysis of such projects in Serbia, revitalising their link with the wider Europeanisation process.
On 4 December 2020, Montenegro’s parliament elected a government led by Prime Minister Zdravko Krivokapić, the leader of the For the Future of Montenegro (Za budućnost Crne Gore, ZBCG) coalition in the 30 August 2020 parliamentary election. This was a landmark in contemporary Montenegrin history. For the first time since Montenegro reestablished a multiparty system in 1990, the Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska partija socijalista, DPS) went into opposition. Despite technically winning the election with 35.06% of the votes, the DPS left power due to the ZBCG’s alliance with the Peace is our Nation (Mir je naša nacija, MNN) and Black on White (Crno na bijelo, CnB) electoral coalitions.
In this paper I address dominant critical discourses of turbo-folk music in Serbia. I suggest that we see music and music related practices as constitutive rather than reflective of identification in order to find a more nuanced ways to understand common discourses of (turbo-) folk critiques and its roles. To that aim, I draw from my long-term fieldwork research in the northern Serbian town of Novi Sad to show how public discourses are played out in private spheres, and also how they are created in and through everyday life. I identify the “anti-folk scene” based on univocal aesthetic exclusion that encompasses people from various social backgrounds and social strata. In conclusion, it could be said that despite its huge popularity and public visibility, turbo-folk remains one of the most important examples of aesthetics of others/other aesthetics in contemporary Serbia.
The European Union’s (EU) role in the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina can be assessed in two different periods. The first period can be described as ‘increased mediation activity’, where one highlight was the signing of the ‘Brussels Agreement’ in 2013 under the supervision of the EU High Representative (HR) Catherine Ashton. By not referring to Kosovo’s status and softening disputed parties’ attitudes towards each other, the HR and the newly-created European External Action Service (EEAS) managed to prove both internally and externally that the EU is a capable and effective mediator. The following period can be labelled as ‘decreased mediation activity’, representing the translation of the Brussels Agreement into reality. During this phase, the dialogue was challenged not only by disagreements between Belgrade and Pristina, but also by disagreements from within the EU.
This article explores the forms and functions of grotesque realism in the play Balkan Spy (1983) (Balkanski špijun) by Dušan Kovačević. The analysis is focused on the mechanisms of grotesque that the author uses in order to create a tragicomic version of reality, and on the effects of this aesthetic choice. The analytical approach to the dramatic text shows that Kovačević employs elements of both conventional and modern theatre. In other words, contemporary grotesque realism, caricature, irony, bitter/dry and subversive humour are the most dominant dramaturgical techniques that the author brings in order to create his characters as well as the absurd world caused by political paranoia.
This paper discusses a specific point of response by Serbian theatre production to the social, political, economic and moral crisis of the 1990s (which includes Serbia’s involvement in the armed conflicts in former Yugoslavia) – namely, different modes of engaging with urban spaces as performance venues. The analysis is based on an in-depth study of the theatre production in Serbia (and Montenegro) in the 1990s, especially as a medium of artistic reflection of the social reality. Against the background of a state of permanent social crisis, which may be traced back to the late 1980s (the late socialist period in Yugoslavia), this study explores the points of closest encounter between the theatre and the city, identifying four basic models of such interaction in this particular social context.
Films produced during the last two decades in the post-Yugoslav states often deal with the subject of these states’ recent history, focusing on the war and its consequences for human beings, as well as the consequences of political and economic transition, such as an increasing wealth gap, criminality, lack of perspectives, unemployment etc. The methods of presentation and modality range from the serious to the comical and grotesque. As these films reflect in special ways people’s new situation in the new post-Yugoslav countries, questions of self-image, understanding of oneself and of the cruel experiences of war are of utmost importance.
In recent post-Yugoslav cinema, trope of troubled youth in films as diverse as Skinning (Stevan Filipović, 2010, Serbia), Children of Sarajevo (Aida Begić, 2012, Bosnia-Herzegovina), Spots (Aldo Tardozzi, 2011, Croatia) and Quit Staring at My Plate (Hana Jušić, 2017) allows for an inspection of the links between youth rebellion, post-conflict trauma and social class. These cinematic depictions of youth-in-crisis, which I refer to as transitional films, offer insights into locally produced ethno-national identities as challenged by the proliferating transnational networks of connectivity. In this essay, I highlight one provocative example of transitional film – Clip (Maja Miloš, 2012, Serbia).
Restitution for the mostly Jewish property and assets that were confiscated by the Nazis during World War II (WWII) in various European states has been a highly debated issue ever since the end of the war. Countries that adhered to the ideas of communism and nationalisation of property in the immediate aftermath of the war failed to address this issue until very recently. Serbia, too, has only began to consider remedying the incredible damage done to its rather small Jewish community. More specifically, in the past decade, Serbia has been trying to repair the damage by passing a series of restitution laws which eventually led to separate legislation on heirless property. This paper explores the substance and application of these laws, as well as the history of discrimination based on which the Serbian Jewish community was persecuted by German occupiers and their collaborators.
April 2017 saw a wave of large demonstrations in cities and towns all across Serbia, following the victory of Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić in the first round of the presidential elections, held on 2 April. With the largest demonstrations taking place in Novi Sad, Niš and Belgrade, with simultaneous protests in smaller towns as well, thousands of students (referred to as “the Facebook generation”) gathered in the streets marching against the “dictatorship” (Protiv diktature). This slogan spread first as the hashtag for the demonstrations on social media networks, and later in general reference to the events.