Unification and Secession: How do Votes in International Organizations influence Cost-benefit Analysis?
Unification or secession efforts, especially those based on nationalistic principles, have been made continuously since at least the 19th century, but the way states exert their influence on the international arena has undergone major transformations. Could these transformations change the motivation of certain states to unify or that of different regions to secede? What is the benefit of having one or more additional state representatives in international organizations? To answer these questions, this paper examines the importance that voting processes in international organizations can have for the cost/benefit calculations of states or particular regions in their national unification or secession efforts. After conceptually isolating the impact of state votes in international organizations as an instrument of foreign policy, the votes are calculated for the four case studies in their current state as well in case of potential unification or secession. The results suggest that, while votes in international organizations do award additional international influence to internationally recognized statehood, today this added value does not constitute an unaffordable cost for unification agendas.
Alban Lauka
Alban Lauka is a PhD candidate at the Georgia State University, Department of Political Science. He completed Master’s degree at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He taught courses in Political Science at the UBT University College in Pristina, as well as at the ISPE University College, Pristina.
1. During the first years of the UN, the Soviet Union attained international representation for Ukraine and Belarus, and its plans to have all its republics represented were only halted by the possibility of 50 US state delegations in response. Nonetheless, Ukraine and Belarus continued to be full members of the UN and had the right to vote in the General Assembly. Do you think it is in the interest of large states to have their constituent parts internationally represented?
2. Will the rise of powerful international bodies, such as the EU, lead to increasing secessionist movements seeking to exploit the benefits of internationally recognized statehood?
3. To what extent are secessions and unifications the outcomes of rational policy choices?
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Alban Lauka
Alban Lauka is a PhD candidate at the Georgia State University, Department of Political Science. He completed Master’s degree at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He taught courses in Political Science at the UBT University College in Pristina, as well as at the ISPE University College, Pristina.